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Spatial congruity effects have often been interpreted as evidence 
for metaphorical thinking, but an alternative markedness-based 
account challenges this view. In two experiments, we directly 
compared metaphor and markedness explanations for spatial 
congruity effects, using musical pitch as a testbed. English 
speakers who talk about pitch in terms of spatial height were tested 
in speeded space-pitch compatibility tasks. To determine whether 
space-pitch congruency effects could be elicited by any marked 
spatial continuum, participants were asked to classify high- and 
low-frequency pitches as 'high' and 'low' or as 'front' and 'back' 
(both pairs of terms constitute cases of marked continuums). We 
found congruency effects in high/low conditions but not in 
front/back conditions, indicating that markedness is not sufficient 
to account for congruity effects (Experiment 1). A second 
experiment showed that congruency effects were specific to spatial 
words that cued a vertical schema (tall/short), and that congruity 
effects were not an artifact of polysemy (e.g., 'high' referring both 
to space and pitch). Together, these results suggest that congruency 
effects reveal metaphorical uses of spatial schemas, not 
markedness effects.  
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Introduction 
Are high hopes somewhere in the air? Or what about rising 
prices? And where exactly are you when you are feeling 
down? Spatial metaphors like these are very common in 
language. Moreover, according to conceptual metaphor 
theory, people not only talk in terms of space but they also 
think metaphorically (i.e. spatially) (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). Whereas arguments in favor of this claim were 
initially based on linguistic data (and thus circular in 
nature), psychological experiments have now shown that 
spatial representations importantly contribute to people’s 
understanding of domains like time (Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008), social dominance (Schubert, 2005), or 
valence (Meier & Robinson, 2004).  
Many of these psychological studies base their findings 
on binary compatibility tasks. In one experiment, for 
instance, participants were asked to classify dimensions in a 
metaphoric target domain (i.e., valence: judge the positive 
or negative valence of a word), while, at the same time 
aspects of the spatial source domain (i.e, location; up and 
down) were varied. In line with "GOOD is UP" metaphors, 
people were faster to evaluate positive words when they 
appeared in a high spatial location compared to a low 
location (and vice versa for negatively valenced words) 
(Meier & Robinson, 2004). Similarly, participants made 
faster judgments about social power when words for 
powerful people are at the top of a display and powerless 
people at the bottom (e.g., ‘king’ above ‘slave’, rather than 
vice versa; Schubert, 2005). These "metaphoric congruency 
effects" (Lakens, 2012), with faster performance for 
congruent compared to incongruent trials, have been taken 
as evidence that metaphoric target domains automatically 
activate congruent spatial information, supporting claims of 
conceptual metaphor theory (e.g. Meier & Robinson, 2004; 
Schubert, 2005).  
On an alternative account, however, it has been argued 
that congruency effects may be better explained as polarity 
alignment effects, also called markedness effects1 (Lakens, 
2012). Like many other continuums in language and mind, 
metaphoric source and target domains (e.g. height or 
happiness) are considered to be bipolar. That is, they consist 
of an unmarked or +polar endpoint (e.g. high, happy), and 
an opposing marked or ‒polar endpoint (low, sad). 
Unmarked endpoints (+polar) are commonly defined as the 
default, evaluatively positive or broader dimension as 
opposed to the marked (‒polar) ones (see e.g., Lehrer, 1985; 
Proctor & Cho, 2006; for a critical approach see 
Haspelmath, 2006). Moreover, there is evidence that 
polarity differences affect cognitive processing. Participants 
show faster reaction times for unmarked (+polar) 
dimensions as compared to marked (‒polar) ones (Clark, 
1969; Seymour, 1974). Reaction time benefits for congruent 
metaphoric dimensions (like happy and up) could thus 
alternatively be explained by an additive processing 
advantage for +polar endpoints (e.g. happy +polar, up 
+polar): Across many studies, perceptual and linguistic 
judgments are faster when the poles of marked continuums 
are aligned (e.g., ‘good’ matched with ‘up’) than when they 
are misaligned (e.g., ‘good’ matched with ‘down’; Clark, 
1969; Lakens, 2012; Proctor & Cho, 2006). The existence of 
markedness effects in binary response compatibility tasks 
raises a question: Does polarity alignment offer an 
alternative, non-metaphorical explanation for “metaphor 
congruency effects” like those reported by Meier & 
Robinson (2004) and Schubert (2005), which rely on 
                                                          
1 Here, the terms "markedness" and "polarity" will be used 
interchangeably.  
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dimensional compatibility in binary speeded response tasks? 
And if so, what would this mean for theories of 
metaphorical mental representation?  
Crucially, not all of the evidence for metaphoric thinking 
comes from (binary) congruency effects. Rather, it has been 
shown that people's metaphoric representations of domains 
like time or musical pitch map onto space in a continuous 
analog fashion (Casasanto, 2010; Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, 
& Casasanto, 2013). English speakers, for instance, who 
talk about musical pitch in terms of spatial height (high vs. 
low pitch; see e.g. Stumpf, 2006) also associate higher 
pitches with higher positions in space in nonlinguistic 
psychophysical tasks. In one study, participants were asked 
to reproduce musical pitches while watching lines varying 
in spatial height. Since lines were presented at multiple 
positions (i.e., 9 levels of height) in a random order, effects 
of space on pitch could not be attributed to (binary) polarity. 
Rather, participants' pitch reproductions were affected by 
the spatial information in a continuous way; tones 
accompanied by higher lines were reproduced at a higher 
frequency on average than the same tones accompanied by 
lower lines, resulting in a linear influence of height on pitch 
(Dolscheid et al., 2013). In this study, responses were not 
speeded, and the metaphor-congruity effects did not rely on 
the kind of binary stimulus-response compatibility that is 
believed to give rise to polarity alignment effects (Proctor & 
Cho, 2006). 
Furthermore, some mappings between space and musical 
pitch go against markedness. Whereas speakers of many 
languages (including English) refer to pitch in terms of 
spatial height, other languages like Farsi or Turkish encode 
pitch in terms of spatial thickness (Shayan, Ozturk, & 
Sicoli, 2011). These thickness-pitch metaphors follow a 
reversed polarity alignment. Thick (+polar) refers to a low 
frequency pitch (‒polar), whereas thin (‒polar) refers to a 
high frequency pitch (+polar). Since Farsi speakers 
implicitly represent pitch in terms of thickness (Dolscheid et 
al., 2013), spatial schemas appear to be more important than 
polarity alignment.  
Although experiments like Dolscheid et al.’s (2013) 
provide evidence for metaphorical mental representation 
that cannot be explained by markedness, the role of 
markedness in binary compatibility tasks remains 
controversial. Do source-target congruity effects merely 
show polarity alignment? Or do they reveal metaphoric 
associations? While metaphors and polarity are often 
indistinguishable in compatibility tasks (see also Lakens, 
2012), we predict that when markedness and metaphor are 
juxtaposed, congruity effects will support metaphoric 
thinking, not markedness. What should matter is whether 
the words that participants have to classify in binary 
compatibility tasks activate the appropriate spatial schema 
(e.g., in the case of space-pitch mappings for English 
speakers, it should be a vertical spatial schema). That is, 
schema-appropriateness should be necessary, and 
markedness may not be sufficient to produce congruity 
effects. 
In Experiment 1, we tested compatibility in height-pitch 
metaphors for 2 pairs of spatial terms, both paradigm cases 
of marked continuums (Clark, 1973). One pair corresponds 
to the poles of the correct spatial continuum (high-low), the 
other to the poles of an incorrect spatial continuum (front-
back). High and front both constitute the unmarked or 
+polar endpoint, whereas low and back represent the 
marked or ‒polar endpoint (see e.g., Clark, 1973; 
Landsberg, 1995). Participants were asked to make binary 
speeded judgments on high-frequency and low-frequency 
pitches, classifying pitches either in a polarity-congruent 
way (e.g. high pitches as high or front), or in a polarity-
incongruent way (e.g. high pitches as low or back). If 
polarity alignment drives space-pitch congruity effects, then 
similar effects should be found when pitch is mapped to any 
marked linear spatial continuum, regardless of its 
orientation: High/low and front/back should both produce 
pitch-congruity effects. Alternatively, if activating a 
particular spatial schema for pitch is critical (i.e., the 
schema that is encoded in the participants' language), then 
high/low should result in a congruency effect, but front/back 
should not.   
Experiment 1 
Methods  
Participants Twenty-four English speakers with no 
reported hearing problems participated for payment (5$ per 
30 minutes). Four participants were excluded from analyses 
for not following instructions (i.e. they responded according 
to the wrong response mapping throughout at least one 
condition). They were replaced by a new sample of 4 
participants who had not previously participated in the task. 
 
Materials and Procedure Participants were asked to 
classify tones (one high and one low pitch) as quickly and 
accurately as possible by pressing buttons on the QWERTY 
keyboard (Q and P-keys). Stimuli were presented on an 
Apple iMac using Vision Egg 2.6 (Straw, 2008). Sounds 
were generated by Audacity software 
(http://audacity.sourceforge.net/) and comprised two pure 
tones (frequency: 262 and 440 hertz). Each tone lasted 400 
ms. Participants listened to one tone at a time, via sealed 
headphones. Immediately following the offset of each tone, 
two response options (e.g., high, low) appeared, one on the 
bottom left and the other on the bottom right of the screen. 
Participants were instructed to classify the sound by 
pressing the button located under the corresponding word 
(e.g., high or low) as fast and accurately as possible. The 
left-right locations of the spatial terms varied randomly 
from trial to trial so that participants could not predict the 
location of the correct word in advance. 
Spatial terms (high-low vs. front-back) were presented in 
2 blocks, a high-low block and a front-back block. Within 
each block, spatial terms were crossed with 2 mappings 
(congruent, incongruent). The order of blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. The order of congruity 
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In two experiments, we show binary response-time 
congruity effects attributable to metaphorical thinking, but 
not to markedness. Classifying pitches with vertical spatial 
terms elicited space-pitch congruity effects, but no 
comparable effects are found when people were asked to 
classify pitches with terms that name the poles of other 
marked spatial continuums (front vs. back; big vs. small). 
Polarity alignment (a.k.a. markedness), therefore, is not 
sufficient to produce space-pitch congruency effects. 
Rather, schema-appropriateness is necessary, supporting 
theories of metaphorical mental representation.  
Moreover, congruity effects are not restricted to 
polysemous words like “high” and “low,” which can be 
used for both space and pitch. Rather, congruity effects can 
also be found for words like “tall” and “short,” which have 
no musical senses, but which activate a vertical spatial 
schema: the “active ingredient” in the observed space-pitch 
congruity effects.  
In most cases, the polarities of metaphorical source and 
target domains are aligned (e.g. Lakens, 2012; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). For instance, happy, powerful, good, and 
high in pitch are all UP (the positive end of this spatial 
continuum), whereas their antonyms are DOWN (the 
negative end of the continuum). This relationship between 
metaphor and markedness makes it hard to determine the 
cause of many response compatibility effects. However, the 
polarities of metaphorical source and target domains are not 
always aligned. Musical pitch provides one domain, in 
which the marked end of the source domain (space) can be 
matched to the unmarked end of the target domain (pitch). 
Farsi speakers, for instance, represent pitch in terms of 
thickness. In Farsi speakers’ language and thought, the 
unmarked pole of the spatial continuum (thick) is aligned 
with the marked pole of the pitch continuum (low 
frequency). Thus, metaphors and markedness can dissociate 
in Farsi – at least to the extent that markedness can be 
established in a principled way. 
Making psychological predictions on the basis of 
markedness is problematic because researchers may 
disagree on how markedness is defined, and even on which 
end of a given continuum is marked. Whereas Schubert 
(2005) describes “powerful” as the marked and “powerless” 
as the unmarked endpoint of the “power” continuum, others 
have suggested the reverse (e.g. Lakens, 2012). In addition 
to these inconsistencies, it is not always clear what 
markedness actually means. By definition, quite a number 
of attributes like frequency, familiarity, or fluency, seem to 
be subsumed under the umbrella term markedness (see 
Haspelmath, 2006). In one experiment, for instance, Lakens 
(2012) manipulated polarity by adjusting the frequency of 
the 'marked' endpoint. While usually marked attributes like 
bad or down (‒polar) occur less frequently, this was no 
longer the case for a group of Laken's participants. 
Critically, these participants also no longer showed a 
congruency effect, which was taken as evidence for a 
polarity account. However, in line with Haspelmath (2006), 
it is questionable why one should talk about polarity when 
actually frequency is driving the effects. Unlike markedness, 
which is a notoriously ambiguous construct (e.g., 
Haspelmath, 2006, enumerates 12 distinct usages of this 
term in cognitive science), metaphors in language are more 
widely agreed upon. Expressions like “a high soprano” and 
“a low bass” make clear predictions about the spatial 
mappings that people should be activating for pitch, and 
therefore what congruity effects should be found: Linguistic 
metaphors tell us which end is “up.”   
Here we find an impact of spatial schemas on source-
target congruity as predicted by metaphors in language. Our 
results suggest an automatic, Stroop-like interference effect 
of metaphorical associations, converging with other findings 
of height-pitch congruity effects. In one task, for instance, 
participants made judgments about musical timbre while 
spatial height information was varied on a computer screen. 
Although pitch was irrelevant to the task, people's 
judgments were affected by the alignment of tonal and 
spatial height (Evans & Treisman, 2010), suggesting a 
highly automatic source-target mapping (see also Rusconi, 
Kwan, Giordano, Umiltà, & Butterworth, 2006; for limits of 
automaticity see Brookshire, Ivry, & Casasanto, 2010).  
Unlike previous experiments, here the spatial source 
domain was not manipulated physically but rather via 
linguistic stimuli (i.e., we presented words like high/low; 
tall/short etc.). This allowed us to directly assess effects of 
polysemy. In Experiment 2, height-pitch congruity effects 
could not simply be attributed to lexical overlap (high/low 
for space and pitch). Rather, we found that words activating 
a similar vertical schema (tall/short) were sufficient to 
trigger space-pitch congruity effects even if the words were 
lexically inappropriate. One could argue, however, that 
congruity effects in tall/short conditions were still indirectly 
driven by polysemy. Participants may have activated 
high/low terminology when classifying pitches, which then 
in turn led to semantic priming from high to tall, and low to 
short. However, although we cannot entirely rule out such 
priming effects, this explanation is unlikely to account for 
our results, for several reasons. According to Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA; http://lsa.colorado.edu/), 'tall' is 
more strongly related to 'short' (LSA cosine: .48) than to 
'high' (LSA cosine: .31). Moreover, 'short' is about equally 
strongly related to 'high' (LSA cosine: .30) as to 'low' (LSA 
cosine: .31). Since activation is expected to spread between 
the most strongly related items (Collins & Loftus, 1975), 
simple spreading activation would have wiped out a 
tall‐short congruity effect rather than producing it. 
Moreover, although big is more closely related to high than 
to low (LSA cosine: .18 versus .12) congruity effects remain 
absent in big/small conditions. The non-significant 
big/small effect even points into the opposite direction (see 
Figure 2), suggesting that semantic priming is unlikely to 
drive the observed patterns of results.2 Thus, while spatial 
                                                          
2 The trend toward a big-low congruity effect could be driven by 
underlying associations between size and pitch (e.g., see Evans & 
Treisman, 2009) – but not by markendess or semantic priming. 
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terms like high/tall/big may be semantically related and 
overlap in markedness, we find that activating the 
appropriate vertical spatial schema is critical for producing 
space-pitch congruity effects.  
Conclusions 
Metaphor congruency effects have been challenged by a 
polarity account, claiming that binary response 
compatibility effects may be better explained by markedness 
than by metaphorical thinking (Lakens, 2012). Indeed, 
metaphor and polarity are often hard to distinguish. 
However, here we show that when polarity and metaphor 
are juxtaposed, congruity effects support metaphorical 
thinking, not polarity.  
Furthermore, these results show that it is not necessary to 
use polysemous words to produce source-target congruity 
effects (i.e., words that can refer to both the metaphorical 
source and target domains). Words that activate a vertical 
schema (e.g., tall/short) produce a space-pitch congruity 
effect despite being lexically inappropriate. Words that 
activate a different spatial schema (e.g., front/back, 
big/small) do not produce any space-pitch congruity effect, 
despite naming the poles of other marked spatial 
continuums.  
Together, these results indicate that activating the 
appropriate spatial schema is the “active ingredient” in 
space-pitch congruity effects – not polysemy or markedness 
– supporting theories of metaphorical mental representation. 
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